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Firm-specific Intangible Assets and Subsidiary Profitability:  
The Moderating Role of  Distance, Ownership Strategy and Subsidiary Experience 
 
ABSTRACT 
How does distance attenuate the value of MNC parent intangible assets on affiliate profitability? Beyond the 
basic assumption of internalization theory about the positive relationship between parent intangibles and 
foreign affiliate performance, we test how this relationship, is contingent on ownership strategy, subsidiary 
experience, and is moderated by the distance between home and host economies, in terms of differences in 
technological capacity, intellectual property regimes, economic development, language and geography. Based 
on newly-available accounting data on intangible assets, we test hypotheses on a sample of  over 2000 
multinationals and 5000 of  their overseas affiliates in 45 home and host economies. 
 
Key Words:  Multinational Enterprise, Intangibles, Profitability, Distance, Ownership Strategy, Subsidiary 
experience. 
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1. Introduction 
Internalization theory has long proposed that the profitability of a multinational company’s (MNC) foreign 
affiliate should correlate positively with the intangible assets of its parent (Buckley & Casson, 1976, or 
Dunning’s (2001) OLI framework). But so far, MNC parent intangible value has mainly been tested by using 
proxies such as the all-company, or parent R&D/Sales ratio or marketing intensity. Recently however, more 
detailed accounting information has become available, where parent MNC intangible value is available as an 
actual financial number. This newly available financial data has not yet been used to test the hallowed 
assumption of internalization theory that parent intangible assets constitute the key competence of modern 
firms and that therefore we should expect a positive association between parent intangibles and subsidiary 
performance (Villalonga, 2004). We contribute to the literature on subsidiary performance by directly testing 
the link between parent intangibles and subsidiary profitability.   
We build on this to focus on a more novel research question about the contingent value of parent 
firm’s intangible assets: “how does the degree of difference between the home (MNC parent) and host 
(subsidiary) country, ownership strategy of the parent firm and subsidiary experience attenuate, or augment, the 
link between parent intangibles and foreign affiliate profits?” Recent academic literature operationalizes these 
differences as institutional, or cultural or geographical “distances” between the nation of the MNC parent and 
the country location of its subsidiary (e.g. Berry, Guillen & Zhou, 2010; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). The literature 
on country location distances, more often than not, takes a negative view of country differences, arguing that 
distance increases the liability of foreignness and creates greater obstacles in transferring ownership-specific 
(parent intangible asset) advantages to distant locations.  
This view emanates from traditional thinking on MNCs, where it was assumed that the value of 
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intangible assets of a MNC diminishes or attenuates as the psychic distance between the home and host country 
increases. However, this assumption is becoming increasingly invalid since (a) MNCs may invest in another 
similar or dissimilar country, and (b) MNCs from emerging and less developed economies are expanding 
internationally, and establishing subsidiaries in countries more institutionally and culturally advanced than their 
own, in search of resources and capabilities (Tung & Luo, 2007). Hence the measurement of distance has to 
take into account the directionality of the foreign direct investment (FDI), or how the destination (host) nation 
compares with the location of the parent. Setting up a subsidiary in a distant country may augment, or diminish, 
the parent firm’s intangible assets (internalization advantage) depending on the directionality of the movement. 
Given that much of the extant literature treats distance bi-directionally neutral (Shenkar, 2012), we make an 
important contribution by examining the effect of  directionality in the distance construct. 
While distance is an exogenous factor, the value of parent intangibles may also be affected by the 
ownership strategy of the parent firms and the subsidiary experience. Accordingly, we argue that the parent 
intangibles – subsidiary performance relationship is likely to be also contingent on these parent and subsidiary 
specific factors. We test our theoretical arguments on data from a sample of 5,010 foreign affiliates belonging 
to 2,301 MNCs over a 12-year time period from 1996 to 2007. Past studies on subsidiary performance have 
often used subsidiary survival as a measure, due to limited availability of financial data at the subsidiary level.  
Other studies have used surveys to measure subsidiary CEO’s perception of subsidiary performance. We 
contribute to this literature by using detailed, actual subsidiary and parent level financial data, which overcomes 
the limitations of relying on survival or perceptual measures. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Why do multinational firms exist? Three theory perspectives 
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Internalization theory and the knowledge based view (KBV) address a fundamental question underlying our 
study: why do MNCs exist? After all, capital, labor and other inputs are nowadays freely and ubiquitously 
available worldwide. If local inputs were the only sources of competitiveness and profitability, local firms would 
always prevail over their multinational rivals who have to overcome the liabilities of distance and foreignness 
to reach all the way into foreign markets in order to compete with local firms. The traditional answer is that 
MNCs possess proprietary intangible assets -- tacit, embedded, or firm-specific, but internally transferrable --  
that are so superior to those of other firms, including local rivals, that even after bearing the higher costs of the 
liability of foreignness (Gaur, Kumar & Sarathy, 2011; Ghemawat, 2001; Hymer, 1976), their foreign affiliates 
thrive and are profitable in distant foreign markets.  
Knowledge-seeking investments, sometimes the motivation for MNCs based in emerging countries 
who wish to access knowledge from a subsidiary in an advanced nation location, can benefit the firm as a whole. 
Clearly, we need to empirically distinguish between subsidiary locations which are institutionally and 
economically inferior, or comparable versus superior to those of the parent nation.  
Three streams of literature in the international management field suggest why companies invest abroad 
despite liabilities of foreignness: (i) Internalization Theory (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1981; 
Hennart, 1982), whereby the MNC accumulates firm-specific capabilities and experience which are more easily 
transferrable, shared and valuable within in its own network of foreign affiliates than exploitable through 
external market-based methods (Delios & Beamish, 2001) ; (ii) the Knowledge-Based Perspective of the firm 
in which the MNC through its network of subsidiaries seeks, or exploits, internally accumulated proprietary 
knowledge, intellectual property, trade secrets and organizational routines – knowledge which is, once again, 
“sticky” within the firm and best transferred within the firm’s hierarchy (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & 
6 
 
Winter, 2002), and (iii) the Resource Based View of the firm (Barney, 1991) wherein the firm develops internal 
assets – mainly intangible – that are valuable, inimitable, rare and best transferrable within the MNC’s network 
of affiliates. The internal transfer of parent intangibles or headquarters capabilities creates value (economic 
rents) in the subsidiary location not merely because of their intrinsic worth (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Dunning, 
2009; Buckley & Casson, 2009, 2010; Hennart, 2010), but also because of the additional benefits of a 
multinational scope, per se, as articulated by Contractor (2012).  
The question addressed in this paper is the extent to which the differences between the countries of  
the parent and subsidiary degrade, or augment, the value of  the intangible assets transferred. MNCs pursue 
strategies to attenuate the liability of foreignness while enhancing the value their subsidiaries can derive in a 
foreign location, utilizing the parent’s intangibles. The net effect on subsidiary profitability depends on the 
relative importance of institutional, economic and other environmental factors in the host market.  
2.2. Intangible assets and subsidiary performance 
Parent firm or company-wide intangible assets include technology or proprietary knowledge, intellectual 
property (IP) such as patents or brands, internal organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 2002), production 
processes (Markusen, 1995), and the firm’s relationships and reputation. These assets (i) are distinctive or 
unique to the firm, (ii) intangible, (iii) proprietary: can be confined or internalized within the firm’s boundary, 
and (iv) transferable to foreign affiliates, so as to extend the MNC’s competitiveness to the foreign nation.  
We propose initially to test this venerable assumption – a positive relationship between a MNC’s 
intangible assets and the performance of  foreign subsidiaries – using more detailed accounting data on MNC 
subsidiaries that has recently become available. Our initial baseline test on a comprehensive international sample 
of  2,301 multinational parents and their 5,010 overseas affiliates, in 45 economies, between 1996 and 2007. The 
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longitudinal nature of  our data allows us to conduct a number of  robustness tests, and a falsification exercise 
that seeks to control for the role of  common shocks affecting the profitability of  both the parent and its affiliate.  
Having established the baseline effect, we examine why different affiliates of a MNC perform unequally, 
despite having the same parent knowledge or capability base. The variation of profitability across subsidiaries 
must be partially explainable by firm-specific factors and country differences between parent and subsidiary 
locations.  
2.3. Distance between home and host country 
Country differences could be a double-edged sword (Björkman, Stahl, & Vaara, 2007; Reus & Lamont, 2009). 
On the one hand, differences in formal and informal institutions such as culture, norms and regulations between 
the home and host country create informational disadvantages for the foreign subsidiary, making it more 
difficult for the parent to transfer its intangibles to its subsidiary. Even within a single firm (the transmission 
of  capabilities from MNC parent to its wholly owned subsidiaries), problems arise due to differences in 
technological capacity, economic development, IP protection and language between the home and host 
countries. These country level differences create monitoring, oversight, and coordination costs even in the case 
of  wholly owned subsidiaries; albeit at lower levels as compared to arms-length licensing contracts, or alliance-
based relationships. On the other hand, distance also provide opportunities to derive benefits such as learning 
and arbitrage, which may not be available in proximate locations (Gaur and Lu, 2007). Thus, in some cases, 
MNCs may derive greater rent by transferring their intangible assets to distant locations if they provide learning 
and arbitrage opportunities. Given these seemingly contradictory effects of distance, it is important to assess 
how distance affects the relationship between MNC’s intangibles and subsidiary performance.   
In the past, an overwhelming majority of  empirical studies measured inter-country differences based 
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on cultural distance, with three-quarters using Hofstede’s (1980) operationalization (Dow & Larimo, 2009).  
The Hofstede cultural distance measures have received serious criticism on many counts.  There is some 
consensus that cultural distance measures provide “… a poor predictor of  distance perceptions” (Hakanson & Ambos, 
2010) and overall empirical conclusions from various studies remain “…ambiguous and contradictory” (Berry, 
Guillen & Zhou, 2010; Popli, Akbar, Kumar & Gaur, 2016). Recent studies have proposed that country 
differences should be measured using multiple dimensions (Berry et al., 2010; Hakanson & Ambos, 2010).  
Following recent studies on cross-national difference, we use five alternate measures to operationalize 
the distance or asymmetry between an MNE’s headquarters nation and the nation of  the affiliate.  For each 
home-host country dyad, we measure the differences in (i) technological capacity, (ii) IP regime, (iii) level of  
economic development, (iv) use of  common language, and (v) geographical distance. These country differences 
are identified as important ones for subsidiary performance in several studies (Berry et al., 2010; Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). The first three of  distance measures are bi-directionally asymmetrical. We 
hypothesize that the MNC subsidiary’s ratio of  benefits derived from parent intangibles versus costs of  liabilities 
of  foreignness, will differ depending on whether the subsidiary is located in an advanced country as opposed 
to a less advanced country. This is consistent with the approach in some recent studies (Berry et al., 2010; 
Zaheer et al., 2012). In the following sections, we develop hypotheses about the moderating effect of  each of  
the five distance variables and two firm-specific variables. 
2.4. Hypotheses 
2.4.1. Technological distance. The transfer of  technology and innovations to another country usually 
involves an asymmetry between transferor and recipient, in terms of  technical capacity or absorptive capacity. 
Even when the transfer occurs between a MNE parent and its foreign affiliate (or vice versa), the two 
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organizations, in separate nations, will likely have a disparity in terms of  the skill sets of  their personnel (Farjoun, 
1998). In the case of  foreign subsidiaries, most technical and administrative personnel are drawn from the local 
talent pool. Their educational background and training is dependent on the level of  technological development 
of  the local market (Florida, 2002). Depending on the relative technological development of  the host market, 
there may be a considerable variation in absorptive capacity and learning (Berry et al., 2010).   
There are competing arguments about the effect of  technological distance as it may enhance as well as 
diminish the value of  parent intangibles for the subsidiaries. With a parent in an advanced nation and its 
subsidiary in a less technologically advanced country, the disparity in technological level is likely to make it more 
difficult for the parent firm to transfer knowledge, particularly when knowledge is tacit (Bell & Zaheer, 2007). 
It may also be more difficult for the subsidiary to derive value from the parent’s intangible assets. Personnel 
from the parent MNC may find it more difficult to articulate and teach their skills to their counterparts in such 
a foreign affiliate (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004). A study by Ambos and Ambos, (2009) examined communication 
and coordination mechanisms used within multinational companies. They found that, while the effectiveness 
of  technical coordination mechanisms (such as protocols, manuals and codified procedures) did not degrade 
over geographical distance between units of  the MNE, the effectiveness of  interpersonal coordination 
mechanisms (such as face to face meetings, mentoring and learning) was compromised with distance.  
On the other hand, when the MNE subsidiary is in a more technologically advanced nation, the 
challenges of  knowledge transfer from the parent to subsidiary are likely to be lower. The more advanced 
technological environment of  the subsidiary’s country might provide greater opportunities for the MNC to 
exploit its knowledge by combining it with the locally available knowledge, or simply by accessing new 
capabilities (Luo and Tung, 2007). Accordingly, we expect technology distance to enhance the positive value of  
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parent intangibles when subsidiaries are located in technologically more advanced locations, but diminish the 
same when subsidiaries are located in technologically less advanced locations. 
Hypothesis 1a (i): Technology capability distance moderates the relationship between parent intangibles 
and subsidiary performance such that the parent intangibles are a) more valuable when subsidiaries are in 
technologically more advanced nations and b) less valuable when subsidiaries are in technologically less advanced 
nations. 
One could also argue for a counter-hypothesis. As firms move from a technologically more advanced 
nation to a less advanced one, the importance of  parent intangibles for subsidiaries in less advance nations may 
become greater if  the local market in an emerging nation exhibits lower competition, and the foreign technology 
is relatively novel. The extant literature on ownership specific advantages of  advanced country MNCs provides 
support for this argument. The literature suggests that advanced country MNCs’ superior technological assets 
more than overcome the liability of  foreignness and other disadvantages in less developed foreign locations 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Dunning, 2009; Buckley & Casson, 2009; Delios & Beamish, 2001).  
The counter-hypothesis also holds that MNCs emanating from emerging nations often do not have 
technological and other intangible assets that may provide them with a competitive advantage against local 
incumbents in advanced economies. The competitive advantage of such MNCs is often based on factor cost 
differentials and institutional resources (Gaur, Kumar & Singh, 2014; Singh & Gaur, 2013). In fact, emerging 
market based MNCs often invest in advanced nation subsidiaries to gain access to, and augment their own, 
intangible assets (Luo & Tung, 2007). These arguments suggest a competing counter-hypothesis as under: 
Hypothesis 1a (ii): Technology capability distance moderates the relationship between parent intangibles 
and subsidiary performance such that the parent intangibles are a) less valuable when subsidiaries are in 
technologically more advanced nations and b) more valuable when subsidiaries are in technologically less 
advanced nations. 
2.4.2. Intellectual property protection regimes. How does the quality of  the IP regime affect the value of  
parent intangibles to affiliate performance? MNCs are less confident in operating in environments with weak 
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IP protection (McCalman, 2004). As the standards of  IP protection differ between the home and host countries, 
MNCs become more careful about transferring their proprietary knowledge and technologies to foreign 
subsidiaries for fear of  losing such knowledge. Weaker IP protection also dampens innovation (Kanwar & 
Evenson, 2003). Weaker government enforcement lowers returns on intangible assets and underutilizes talent 
at the affiliate country level (Zhao, 2006), increases fears of  unintended technology spillover and to that extent 
inhibits the transfer of  the latest technologies from MNE headquarters to such affiliates (Maskus & Yang, 2004).   
In contrast, when firms move to stronger IP protection regimes, the fear of  misappropriation is 
substantially reduced. This encourages MNCs to transfer their most advanced technological knowhow and even 
enhance it by making use of  locally available technology. Thus, when the perceived level of  IP protection is 
seen as low in the subsidiary country, MNCs not only are loath to transfer intangible assets and knowledge 
from parent to the subsidiaries, they also do not do much knowledge-intensive work at the subsidiary level.  
Subsidiaries in weaker IP protection regimes, ceteris paribus, operate typically at the low value portions 
of  the value chain.  While these lower-end activities add to the overall firm value, the profitability of  
subsidiaries doing such activities is not very good. On the other hand, MNCs perform their high value-added 
activities in locations with high IP protection and derive greater value from transferring knowledge from parent 
to the subsidiary. Thus, difference in IP regimes condition the relationship between parent intangibles and 
subsidiary performance depending on the relative strength of  IP regimes between the home and host locations.  
Hypothesis 1b: IP distance moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and subsidiary performance such 
that the parent intangibles are a) more valuable when subsidiaries are in stronger IP regime nations and b) less valuable 
when subsidiaries are in weaker IP regime nations. 
2.4.3. Economic distance. Economic distance, as measured by difference in the per capita income levels 
between the nation of  the MNC parent and the country of  its subsidiary, has been used by scholars as a 
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surrogate for institutional or psychic distance (Berry et al., 2010; Hakanson & Ambos, 2010). The traditional 
theory approach has been to focus on institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This view suggests 
that similarity in economic levels facilitates the replication of  the MNC parent’s capabilities in a foreign setting, 
while dissimilarity increases the liability of  foreignness and the foreign market entry threshold (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006). While the correlation is not perfect, institutional isomorphism has been linked to similarity 
in levels of  economic development (Beckert, 2010). Yang, Martins and Driffield (2013) found that the economic 
distance between home and host countries plays significant role on multinational performance.  
But in this study we expand the concept and refine it further to ask about the ‘directionality’ of  the 
difference. One can identify two cases. (1) where the level of  economic development of  the home/parent firm 
nation is higher than that of  the subsidiary, or (2) where the home nation level is lower than the country of  the 
subsidiary. In both cases there are obstacles and liabilities of  foreignness to be overcome which, ceteris paribus, 
will negatively affect subsidiary performance. However, firms can derive more value from their intangible assets 
from subsidiaries in more economically developed countries than their home markets, because of  greater 
purchasing power, per capita. Often, consumers in economically more developed countries are willing to pay a 
higher premium for high quality products. Such markets also value, and are willing to reward, innovations and 
are more amenable to new products, which carry a higher unit price1 (Hummels & Lugovskyy, 2009). On the 
other hand, in economically less developed countries, consumers have lower purchasing power, and therefore 
may not be willing to pay a premium (i.e., adequately value or compensate for MNC intangibles). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that emerging market firms often take their most sophisticated products to advanced 
                                                 
1 Marketing and economics models recognize that competition or “crowding” can reduce the value of higher unit prices on 
profitability, but nevertheless conclude, in general, that advanced nations provide superior returns.  
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economies to derive more value from their intangible assets. Thus, while we hypothesize that economic distance 
diminishes the positive effect of  MNC intangibles on subsidiary performance, in general, we add qualifications 
or contingencies noted in the hypothesis below.   
Hypothesis 1c: Economic distance moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and subsidiary performance 
such that the parent intangibles are a) more valuable when subsidiaries are in more economically developed nations and 
b) less valuable when subsidiaries are in less economically developed nation. 
2.4.4. Dissimilarity in language. Language plays an important role in international business operations in 
terms of  understanding foreign culture and customers, in communications between parent and subsidiary 
personnel, operating procedures and organizational routines, and in adapting marketing strategies. Several 
studies have found language distance to affect foreign market entry choices (Ghemawat, 2001; Johanson & 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), negotiations in establishing foreign enterprises (Brewer, 2007), and foreign subsidiary 
management in general (Hakanson & Ambos, 2010). In a study of  bilateral trade between the US and other 
nations, Hutchinson (2005) found that trade flow deteriorated with a larger linguistic distance between English 
and the language of  the trading partner nation. These results were robust for both exports and imports as well 
as for consumer and intermediate goods. 
Chen, Geluykens, and Choi (2006) and Shenkar et al. (2008) detail the challenges that language barriers 
create for MNCs due to the difficulties in communication and coordination across borders. MNCs have to put 
in extra resources to make sure that the messages between the MNC parent and its subsidiaries are not 
misinterpreted. Fearing miscommunication, MNC parents often scale down their involvement in a country with 
greater language distance. Language differences also make it more difficult for MNCs to achieve global 
integration (Marschan, Welch, & Welch, 1997). Thus language differences are likely to adversely affect subsidiary 
profitability. 
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When it comes to transferring intangibles between the MNC parent and its subsidiaries, language 
barriers create significant challenges to knowledge flows (Harzing & Feely, 2008), often leading to 
misinterpretation by different parties.  DePalma and Beninatto (2002) found that firms in English speaking 
countries spend upwards of  2.5% of  their total non-US revenue in translation-related expenses. These costs 
are accentuated in industries with a greater emphasis on innovations and patenting. These findings suggest that 
there are significant costs in transferring parent intangibles to subsidiaries located in countries with a different 
language. Thus language differences have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between parent 
intangibles and subsidiary performance. 
Hypothesis 1d: Dissimilarity in language negatively moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and 
subsidiary performance. 
2.4.5. Geographical distance. Geographic distance has been used in several studies as a measure of  friction 
in international operations. As the geographic distance between the home and host countries increases, MNCs 
face a heightened level of  information asymmetry. For example, Ragozzino and Reuer (2011) find that 
geographic distance increases information asymmetry in the case of  cross-border acquisitions. Likewise, 
Ragozzino (2009) finds that acquirers find it easier to gather information through informal channels if  the 
target firm is located in proximate countries. On first blush, simple geographical distance may seem to be a 
rather crude indicator. However, several studies have used geographic distance as a measure of  information 
asymmetry and other difficulties that firms face in foreign countries. For example, scholars have shown that 
measures of  geographic distance negatively affects the volume of  global trade (Disdier & Head, 2008), and 
even in service industries, such as informational technology offshoring, where transportation costs become 
irrelevant (Aubert, Rivard & Templier, 2011). Malhotra & Gaur (2014) show how geographical distance alters 
the propensity of  MNCs to opt for full versus partial equity in cross-border acquisitions. 
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High levels of  information asymmetry lead to the problems of  adverse selection and moral hazard in 
foreign subsidiary management. With incomplete information about the host markets, MNCs often make sub-
optimal choices when it comes to selecting suppliers and distributors or other local business partners, and it is 
not easy for MNCs to monitor the local supply chain or marketing partners. As a result, subsidiaries that are 
located in geographically distant locations perform worse than those that are in proximate locations. In the case 
of  cross-border alliances, Zaheer & Hernandez (2011) found that alliance performance was inversely related to 
the average mileage distance from an exploration alliance to the nearest subsidiary.  
A high level of  information asymmetry makes MNCs more cautious in transferring their intangibles 
to distant locations because of  the risk that their technology is misappropriated by the local partners or 
employees. Even if  the risk of  misappropriation is absent, it is more difficult to effectively transfer intangible 
assets to locations about which when the parent firm may not have adequate understanding. As a result, foreign 
subsidiaries in distant locations may not be able to utilize the benefits of  parent intangibles. Hence, 
Hypothesis 1e: Geographic distance negatively moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and subsidiary 
performance. 
2.5. Ownership strategy 
In addition to the external factors, firm level strategies and experience also affect the value of parent or MNC-
wide intangible assets at the subsidiary level. While most MNC affiliates are fully-owned, others have some 
equity held by local parties. The parent’s ownership level in a foreign affiliate reflects its level of control and 
commitment towards affiliate’s operations (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Dhanraj & Beamish, 2004). When 
parent firms have a higher level of ownership, they wish to control affiliate’s operations by appointing their 
own people in key positions, especially in distant countries (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007). Such deployment 
of personnel makes it easier to transfer firm specific resources and capabilities to the affiliate. Parent firm 
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employees in key affiliate positions can also ensure that affiliates pursue policies that are consistent with the 
overall strategic intent of the parent firm and do not diverge from their assigned mandate. 
With greater control comes greater confidence. If a MNC parent is confident about the actions and 
strategic intent of its affiliate, it is more likely to transfer its intangible assets to the affiliate. With a higher level 
of ownership, the parent firm is likely to have less concern that the transferred knowledge may be misused by 
the foreign affiliate partner (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Extant literature suggests that finding trustworthy partners in 
foreign joint ventures is difficult (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). With a higher level of ownership, even if the local 
partner is not very trustworthy, the MNC parent can delineate roles of different partners and institute 
organizational mechanisms to ensure that the local partner does not take undue advantage of the intangibles 
transferred from the parent to the local affiliate.   
Transfer of intangible assets also becomes easier if there are mechanisms in place for such transfers.  
With a greater equity control, MNCs can set up knowledge transfer mechanisms by employing the right set of 
people and establishing proper communication channels (Anderson, Gaur, Mudambi, & Persson, 2015). Thus, 
when an MNC holds a majority stake in an affiliate, it commitment, intent and ability to transfer intangible 
assets to the affiliate increases, while fear of misappropriation and misallocation reduces.  With a greater stake, 
MNCs have greater control over strategy formulation and implementation, resource allocation decisions, and 
operations at the affiliate level.  Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: MNCs’ ownership strategy (majority versus minority control) positively moderates the relationship 
between parent intangibles and affiliate performance. 
2.6. Local subsidiary experience 
Subsidiary experience is an important factor in overcoming the liability of  foreignness over time. As subsidiaries 
age, accumulated local experience helps them in developing more social links, local market knowledge, and 
17 
 
rapport with local stakeholder groups (Sohn, 1994), which reduce unfamiliarity and relational hazards in the 
host country (Gaur & Lu, 2007). As subsidiaries develop a better understanding of  the local context, they can 
adapt their strategies to local market needs (Mitchell, Shaver & Yeung, 1992). Subsidiaries also develop locally 
embedded resources and capabilities, which may be of  some value to the peers or even the parent firm (Makino 
& Delios, 1996). All these factors enhance the value of  parent intangibles for the subsidiary. When subsidiaries 
have a better understanding of  the local context, they can effectively combine their local market knowledge 
with the parent firm capabilities to develop products and services suitable for the local markets. 
Longer local market experience also enhances the transfer of  an appropriate selection of  resources 
and capabilities from the parent firm to the subsidiary (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Gaur, Kumar & Singh, 2014; 
Kostova, 1999). MNC capabilities and assets may not all be effective when transferred to another environment 
(Gaur & Lu, 2007), unless the subsidiary has gained a deep understanding of  the local context (Jensen & 
Szulanski, 2004; Kostova, 1999; Luo, 1997) so as to know how to adapt the MNC parent’s capabilities for 
effective local use. As subsidiaries age, they gain a better understanding of  the local context, which then helps 
in effective transfer as well as better utilization of  the parent intangibles at the subsidiary level. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3: Subsidiary age positively moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and subsidiary 
performance. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample and data 
We draw our sample from the Orbis database of  Bureau van Dijk which recently began to publish detailed 
accounting and financial information for firms across the world including their intangible assets. Orbis defines 
foreign affiliates as firms where the parent company has a minimum of  25.01% shareholding, although most 
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are majority or fully owned. Accounting and financial information for parents and affiliates are longitudinal, 
while the information on the link between the affiliate and the parent is only available for the last year in which 
the parent appears in the data. We assume that the two firms were linked during all years for which we have 
information on affiliates. A few other papers (e.g. Yang et al., 2013, Driffield et al 2016) make this similar 
assumption when using Amadeus (European version of Orbis) and Orbis data. The initial firm samples we 
have include 3,438 multinational parents and their 9,280 overseas subsidiaries. We only include those firms for 
which the database has complete information on sales, return on assets, capital, leverage, intangible assets and 
employment levels. We include a vector of  these variables in our regression estimation to measure firm 
heterogeneity. This criterion leads to the exclusion of  several firms in some countries, in particular Brazil, 
Canada, China, Iceland, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey. 
However, this is not a relevant problem for the overwhelming majority of  countries.  
With the above restrictions, we obtained complete information on a total of  2,301 multinational 
parents and 5,010 of  their foreign subsidiaries over a 12-year time period from 1996 to 2007. A total of  1,575 
out of  5,010 affiliates are located in entirely different continents than their parents. 
3.2. Variables 
Intangible assets are considered by economists and accountants to be the primary determinant of  the long term 
profitability of  companies (Villalonga, 2004). Intangible assets reported in Orbis data use International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 (Ribeiro et al. 2010). An intangible asset is an identifiable asset -- without physical 
substance, but allocated a monetary value -- such as computer software, patents, copyrights, motion picture 
films, customer lists, mortgage servicing rights, licenses, import quotas, franchises, customer and supplier 
relationships, marketing rights, and development costs, that is expected to generate income in the future. 
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Intangible assets in Orbis are initially valued by accountants at cost less any amortization and impairment losses, 
followed later by a reassessed valuation based on fair market value determined with reference to an active market. 
Our dependent variable is affiliate performance measured by its return on assets. We measure ownership strategy 
depending on if the subsidiary is majority owned or not. The ‘Majority owned’ dummy variable is equal to one if 
the parent company owns at least 50% share in its overseas affiliate. We measure subsidiary experience by 
taking a natural log of the age of a subsidiary. Subsidiary age reflects the maturity of the foreign subsidiary and is 
a direct measure of the experience in a specific product-geographic market (Gaur, Delios and Singh, 2007).  
Next, to determine whether the country differences in technological capacity, IP protection, economic 
development, common language and geographic distances between the home and host locations moderate the 
effect of  intangibles on affiliate performance, we add distance variables as below.  
3.2.1. Technological capacity difference between pairs of  countries. This is obtained from the difference 
in the total number of  resident patent applications per one million population in the two countries, as available 
from the World Bank indicators.  
)/()/( yHostCountr
residents
yHostCountryHomeCountr
residents
yHomeCountr PopulationPatentPopulationPatent   
Patent data are often used as a surrogate measure of  a nation’s technological capability (Berry et al 
2010).  
3.2.2. Intellectual property rights (IPR) differences. This is computed from the difference in the Park (2008) 
IPR index for the two countries. We used the 2000 IPR indexes for the period corresponding to 1996-2000 and 
the 2005 IPR indexes for the period corresponding to 2001-2007. 
3.2.3. Economic development differences. This is the difference in GDP per capita between the country 
where the parent is located and the country where the affiliate is located, obtained from the World Development 
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Indicators (World Bank, 2010). This measure of  course can include both positive and negative values, although 
the first type is much more prevalent – suggesting that, as a generalization, the overwhelming bulk of  FDI 
continues to originate from countries with a higher economic level and flows to nations with lower economic 
development. 
3.3.4. Common language. As a proxy we constructed a dummy variable equal to one if  the two countries 
have the same official language, and zero otherwise. 
3.4.5. Geographical distance. The distance (log kilometers) between the capital cities of  parent and affiliate 
country, following the `great circle formula', as available from the CEPII Distances Dataset. 
3.5. Control variables  
We also include control variables suggested by the literature to measure heterogeneous firm characteristics 
namely firm age (Yang and Driffield 2012), debt to equity ratio (Pantzalis 2001), wage per worker (Martins and Yang 
2015) and capital per worker (Driffield et al 2016). Additionally, we control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects 
and the home and host country GDP. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents key summary statistics for the 21,108 observations, covering 45 economies, in our data set -- 
each observation corresponding to a unique parent-affiliate-year combination. These 45 economies account for 
over 95% of  all inward FDI stocks, UNCTAD (2015). As one would expect, we find that affiliates have much 
smaller average workforces (1,349 vs. 45,033 employees) and much smaller average levels of  sales (€ 354 vs. € 
9,723 million). Compared to affiliates, multinational parents tend to have more capital (€ 3,038 vs. € 66 million), 
and have more intangibles assets (€ 1,739 vs. 21 million). Monetary values were converted into Euros using 
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exchange rates retrieved from the IMF. In order to adjust for the purchasing power parity and inflation, all 
monetary data are converted in real terms using real effective exchange rates as a deflator.  Twenty eight 
percent of  affiliates are majority owned by parent companies. 
------Insert Table 1 about here------ 
The time coverage of  the data is centered around 2002, with a standard dispersion of  2.57 years. Each 
parent-affiliate match appears on average 5.3 times (standard deviation of  2.54), which facilitates a longitudinal 
analysis and thereby controlling for time-invariant (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity. The distance 
variables in Table 1 show that, on average, parents are located in countries with better IPR regimes and higher 
economic development, relative to the countries where their affiliates are located. We also find 20% of  the 
parent-affiliate pairs operate in countries that have the same language, and the average geographic distance of  
the parent-affiliate pairs is 2,828 kilometers. 
Table 2 reports the correlation among the explanatory variables. Among the firm-level variables we see 
that intangibles, wage, capital and employment have the expected correlation sign – intangibles positively 
correlated with firm capital, wage and firm size. Among the firm-level variables we see the calculated r values 
range from -0.004 to 0.1, suggesting no issue of  multicollinearity. Among the distances variables we find that 
the calculated r values range from -0.167 to 0.469. As expected, economic distance between countries is 
positively correlated (0.264) with the distance of  intellectual property rights. In addition, countries who share 
the same language are likely located in closer geographical distance, and are likely to have shorter distance in 
economic development, technological capabilities and intellectual property rights.   
------Insert Table 2 about here------ 
The data cover 45 economies, including many OECD countries and also the largest developing nations. 
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Appendix Table A presents data separately for multinational parents and overseas subsidiaries, with the most 
important variables used in our analysis, and averages for return on assets and intangibles. Unsurprisingly, most 
parents are concentrated in developed countries, with significant numbers in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., which 
account for 91% of  all parents. The greatest numbers of  overseas subsidiaries are found in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, Sweden and the U.K., which account for 92.7% of  all overseas subsidiaries included in our data set [Refer 
to Appendix Table A at the end].  
4.2. Results for the initial baseline check  
Tables 3 reports our first set of  estimates with Affiliate Profitability as the dependent variable. The results 
confirm our baseline check of  internalization theory (not the principal intent of  this paper) – that, in general, 
affiliate profitability is positively linked to intangible assets. We do this because, until recently, intangible assets 
were measured by proxies such as research or marketing intensity. Today, newly-available financial data enable 
us to test this venerable assumption of  theory in a more focused accounting manner than before. In Table 3, 
Columns 1 and 2 control for affiliate fixed effects and year effects. Across all columns, we find that affiliate 
intangibles have the predicted positive effect upon affiliate performance, and affiliate firm age and wage and 
host country economic development also have expected positive effect on generating higher affiliate 
profitability, and affiliate leverage plays negative effect on affiliate profitability. In particular, MNE parent 
intangible assets have a positive (0.321) and significant effect upon affiliate profitability after controlling for 
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year fixed effects and differences in affiliate capital, leverage, firm age, wage, and employment2.  
------Insert Tables 3 about here------ 
While the affiliate fixed effects used in columns 1 and 2 Table 3 above control for time-invariant 
heterogeneity, one should check whether the estimates suffer from a simultaneity or endogeneity bias. For 
instance, parents and affiliates may suffer from demand shocks that occur at the same time which could lead to 
a misleading interpretation of  the effect of  parent intangibles on affiliate profitability. In addition, to some 
extent, the profits of  an affiliate could redound back to the intangibles of  its parent. In order to address these 
concerns we draw on a generalized method of  moments instrumental variable (GMM-IV) estimator that 
instruments for current-period parent intangibles using one year and two-year lagged values of  parent 
intangibles. At the same time, we also control for firm fixed effects and year effects. 
Columns 3-5 of  Table 3 uses no weights in column 3, weights by parent country FDI outflows in 
column 4, and weights by affiliate country FDI inflows in column 5. The estimates of  the parent intangible 
effect on affiliate profitability range between 0.843 and 0.906 and are always significant. The instruments – one 
and two lagged parent intangibles also display significant effects in the first stage, as expected. Moreover, the 
Sargan test of  over-identification and tests of  weak-identification and under-identification indicate that the 
instruments are valid across all columns.  
4.3. Falsification test 
                                                 
2 In order to check that that our sample of  parents and affiliates is representative of  the country distribution of  foreign direct investment 
in the world, we reran the models of  Table 3 but instead weighted each observation using by turn the levels of  FDI of  the parent 
country (outflows) or of  the host country (inflows), using data from UNCTAD. The new estimates are very similar. This suggest that 
our estimates do not have biases raised from global foreign direct investment patterns. These are available upon request. 
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As mentioned earlier, the concern about exogenous economic perturbations that simultaneously influence the 
intangibles of  parents and the performance of  affiliates may also need a falsification test. Or, for example, a 
worldwide increase in technology capability in an industry could presumably raise the performance of  an 
affiliate and the intangibles of  its parent, in which case imputing causality as per internalization theory, between 
parent intangible assets and affiliate performance, could be problematic. The idea of  a falsification test is to 
select information from firms that are very similar and therefore would be subject to the same shocks as the 
matched counterpart. We then took the intangible assets of  the matched parent (Intangibles
Pmatch
it

) and used 
that in the regression in place of  the intangibles of  the true parent and redid our previous estimations.  
If  this exercise results in similar or at least significant estimates of  our desired internalization effect, 
i.e., that affiliate performance is linked to parent intangible assets, then we would have to revisit our 
interpretation of  our previous estimates (in Tables 3). On the other hand, if  this exercise results in insignificant 
estimates, then that would be reassuring and consistent with our preferred interpretation of  resource 
internalization. We conduct the falsification test by matching MNE parents to other parents that are very similar 
in a number of  characteristics (available in our data set) in the spirit of  a propensity score matching analysis 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983). We required that each MNE parent and its match (another MNE parent) be 
located in the same industry and same country. The range of  variables initially available for the matching 
exercise was reasonably large (employment, profit, intangibles, sales, capital, age, number of  affiliates, year), and 
certainly at least comparable to numbers used in other empirical papers. We also considered several 
transformations of  these variables (squares, cubes, interactions of  two and three variables) in order to obtain a 
more precise correspondence between the two, matched parents, along observable dimensions, in the spirit of  
a propensity score matching exercise.  
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We started by pooling all parents and affiliates and then estimated a logit model where the dependent 
variable is a parent dummy (1 if  firm is the parent) and the regressors are the variables and polynomials 
described above. Using these coefficients, we computed the probability that each parent is in fact a parent (the 
alternative being an affiliate). In the last step of  this analysis, we found which parent is the best match for each 
other parent by comparing their probabilities of  parenthood. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the quality of  the match obtained. These variables are 
measured in ratios. We divide the difference of  the two figures (true parent and fake parent's value) by the mean 
of  the same two figures). The results indicate a very good quality in the matching, as the average ratios are 
always low - even if  the standard deviations are relatively high. Furthermore, we find that matching also on 
parent intangibles does not lead to a sizable deterioration of  the quality of  matching, which is further evidence 
that our matched parents are similar to the original parents.  
------Insert Table 4 about here------ 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. “Intangibles, matched parents” is the intangible assets 
of fake parents. Column 2 and 4 weights each observation inversely to the absolute difference in the propensity 
score of  the parent and its match. In other words, these results attach greater importance to parents that are 
better matched. The first set of  estimates (columns 1 to 2), where parent intangible assets are ignored as a 
matching variable, show that all effect of  matched-parent intangibles are insignificant, and the point estimates 
are negative at the insignificance level. To provide an additional robustness check, we also report results in 
column 3 and 4 when the match is based on the matched parent’s intangibles in addition to the other matching 
variables (second panel of  Table 5). Again, the effect of  intangibles disappears. The results of  the Falsification 
Test are reassuring, in that they suggest no evidence for a spurious relationship between parent intangibles and 
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affiliate performance, and lean in favor of  a causal interpretation between the two. 
------Insert Table 5 about here------ 
4.4. Results for the distance variables and affiliate characteristics 
Having provided evidence of  a causal link between intangible assets and affiliate profitability, we now turn to 
the question of  how this link (or affiliate profitability) is moderated by “distance” between the nation of  MNE 
parent and affiliate. These results are presented in Table 6. 
------Insert Table 6 about here------ 
In Models (1) through (5) each distance measure is introduced together with its interaction term with 
parent firm intangibles. We find that technology distance positively moderates the relationship between parent 
intangibles and subsidiary performance. The results are robust when we use total patent applications, or total 
patent applications per million population, or total patent applications per million GDP to measure 
technological capability of  each nation. Thus, we find support for the alternate counter-hypothesis H1a (ii), 
while rejecting H1a (i). Other hypotheses about the moderating effect of  distance variables are also supported. 
The greater the economic gap between the home and host countries, the weaker the link between parents’ 
intangibles and affiliate performance. Similarly, the link is weaker when parent and affiliate are in the country 
that don’t share the same language. IPR and geographic distances have a negative moderating effect as 
hypothesized.  
We illustrate the interaction effects in Figure 1, showing a clear and moderating role of  distances, and 
the directionality of  the difference. In Figure 1, we find that parent intangible effects becomes weaker when 
the IPR or economic distance moves from zero to a very large positive (i.e. two standard deviation plus the 
mean), and this suggests that the internalization effects are smaller when an affiliate is located in a country with 
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lower IPR, technological capabilities or economic development (Columns 1 and 3 in table 6), relative to its 
home country. However, internalization effects become stronger when an affiliate is located in countries with 
higher IPR or economic development. When looking at the moderating role of  technological distance, we find 
that the internalization effect becomes stronger when MNEs invest in countries with lower technological 
capabilities, while the effect turns to be smaller when host countries have higher technological capabilities than 
home country (Column 2 in table 6). 
------Insert Figure 1 about here------ 
We now turn to testing whether the link between parents’ intangibles and affiliate performance will be 
moderated by the affiliate ownership and experience in Table 7. First, we split our samples in terms of  majority 
owned versus minority owned controlled affiliates. We find that the relationship between parent intangibles and 
subsidiary performance is higher (0.764 vs. 0.185) in the subsample of  majority owned affiliates, relative to 
minority owned affiliates. The result is consistent with our Hypothesis 2, suggesting MNC’s ownership strategy 
(majority versus minority control) moderates the internalization effects. Finally, we investigate the role of  
subsidiary experience by considering a new interaction: the subsidiary’s age. Column 3 shows that affiliate age 
positively moderates the relationship between parent intangibles and subsidiary performance, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. Our main results presented in tables 3-5 are robust when we use affiliate net 
profit as the dependent variable. We utilize F test to compare the restricted and unrestricted models and assess 
if  addition of  moderating effects improves the overall model fit (Wooldridge 2002). The F statistics in all model 
comparisons is significant, which suggests that each of  the interaction variables significant improve the model 
fit. 
------Insert Table 7 about here------ 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In international management, two issues significantly affect global strategy. The first concerns the impact of  
accumulated intangible assets at the parent firm level on subsidiary profitability. This is a venerable 
“international theory” question which we test using new accounting data on MNC intangibles. The second and 
more important question is why different subsidiaries of  the same firm, with access to the same intangible 
resources, exhibit different levels of  profitability. This paper seeks an explanation based on how the differences 
between the parent and subsidiary nations, parent firm’s ownership strategy and subsidiary experience affect 
the link between parent intangibles and the subsidiary’s profitability  
If  “…international management is management of  distance,” (Zaheer et al., 2012, p. 19; emphasis in original), 
then the measurement and operationalization of  the various aspects of  “distance” between countries by 
International Business scholars appears to need more work. Other than the use of  cultural distance as a measure 
of  country differences, the extant empirical work on this issue is relatively sparse. Much effort and talent over 
a quarter century went into measuring “cultural distance” since Kogut and Singh’s (1988) catalyzing paper. 
Cultural distance is an inescapably important issue in foreign direct investment. However, over the years, 
contradictory and inconclusive empirical results culminated in a searing critique by Shenkar (2012), who agrees 
that cultural differences are a very important explanation, but that the methodological and data shortcomings 
of  the cultural distance construct and its various operationalizations have produced only inconclusive results. 
We contribute to this literature by examining how “distance” or asymmetry as operationalized by variables other 
than cultural distance, such as economic, legal, linguistic and institutional differences between the nations of  
MNE parent and its affiliate (H1), as well as entry mode choice (H2) and subsidiary age (H3), moderate 
(augment or degrade) the expected positive effect of  MNE intangible assets on foreign affiliate profitability.  
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Recently, more detailed data on multinational company parents and affiliates have become available, 
which enabled us to construct a firm-level panel of  more than 2000 multinationals and over 5000 of  their 
overseas affiliates, covering 45 home and host economies. Many of  these parent-affiliate pairs are located in 
different continents and in very different country settings. The data include accounting measures for intangible 
assets (under International Accounting Standards IAS 38) with which we first check the fundamental postulate 
of  internalization theory (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976 or Dunning, 1981) that foreign affiliate performance is 
positively related to the level of  parent MNE intangible assets and the profitability of  its foreign affiliates. We 
do this because newly-available financial measures for intangible assets of  MNCs are a far better index than 
proxies such as marketing or R&D intensity, used in the past.   
We build on this to ask a more contemporary question, one of  current academic interest: “How does 
‘distance’ between the nation of  the parent and that of  its subsidiary degrade or augment the link between 
MNE parent intangibles and affiliate profitability?” Even before the current state of  ambiguity about the 
operationalization of  the cultural variable measure, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) suggested that the 
measurement of  distance should include variables besides those tracking cultural traits, to encompass “…factors 
preventing the flow of  information to and from the (foreign) market. Examples are differences in language, education, business 
practices, culture and industrial development.” (parentheses added for clarification). Moreover, the above quote implied 
that economic, legal, institutional and linguistic differences would have a negative impact. Other things being 
equal, that distance would negatively affect foreign affiliate profitability. More recently, Ghemawat (2001), 
Brewer (2007), Berry, Guillen and Zhou (2010), Hakanson and Ambos (2010), and several others have proposed 
a multi-dimensional or multi-variable operationalization of  the distance construct. 
In our paper, we use five dimensions for the measurement of  distance between MNE parent and its 
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affiliates, operationalized as the dyadic differences between the nation of  the parent and nation of  affiliate in 
terms of  (i) Technological capacity, (ii) IP protection regime, (iii) Economic development level, (iv) Common 
language, and (v) Geographical distance. The results largely support our hypotheses. A greater technology 
capacity distance suggests a greater impediment and utilization of  knowledge (Zaheer, Schomaker & Nachum, 
2012; Ambos & Ambos, 2009) when the parent comes from a technologically less developed country. However, 
when the parents comes from a technologically more advanced nation, technological distance makes the parent 
intangibles more useful for enhancing subsidiary profitability. A gap in the level of  IP enforcement, between 
parent and subsidiary countries, has three consequences. Weaker enforcement in the subsidiary country lowers 
returns on intangible assets (Zhao, 2006), dampens innovation (Kanwar & Evenson, 2003), and inhibits the 
transfer of  latest technology (Maskus & Yang, 2004). Such “frictions” to use Shenkar’s (2012) term, reduce 
performance at the affiliate level. On the other hand, a common language in the nations of  MNE parent and 
affiliate makes transfer of  intangibles easier, and consequently positively moderates the relationship between 
intangibles and affiliate profitability.  These results reinforce the findings in Hakanson & Ambos (2010) and 
Brewer (2007) about the effect of  a common language.  
A significant contribution of  this paper is to illustrate how the directionality of  the difference between 
MNC home and subsidiary nation matters. Our findings, illustrated in Figure 1, show that the internalization 
effect (value of  MNC intangibles) is weaker when an affiliate is located in a country with lower IPR, or economic 
development, but stronger when the affiliate is located in country with lower technological capabilities, relative 
to its home country. By the same token, internalization effects become stronger when an affiliate is located in 
countries with higher IPR or economic development, but weaker with higher technological capabilities. This 
adds nuances to the existing literature. For instance, Dow & Karunaratna (2006) suggest that liability of  
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foreignness increases with economic distance. But here we find that it increases even more when the subsidiary 
in in a lower per capita economy.  
The effect of  parent intangibles on performance in majority owned subsidiaries is bigger than in 
minority owned subsidiaries. This suggests that internal organizational embeddedness matters (Meyer, 
Mudambi & Narula, 2011; Song et al., 2011). A higher level of  internal embeddedness (majority to full equity 
ownership) facilitates the transfer of  parent MNC intangible assets and capabilities to the foreign operation. 
Equivalently, one can say that the willingness of  MNCs to share their proprietary intangible assets is positively 
correlated to the level of  their equity ownership in a foreign affiliate. In retrospect this may appear consistent 
with received wisdom, but until detailed affiliate profitability data were available for this study, this had not been 
empirically proven. In addition, we found that subsidiary age positively moderates the relationship between 
parent intangibles and subsidiary performance. MNC parent and subsidiary managers gain international 
experience through longer commitment and learning about the overseas market through local networking, 
resource commitments. Such experience helps in legitimacy improvements and input localization (Luo et al., 
2002; Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 2009), and alleviates the problems of  liability of  foreignness (Mezias 2002).  
Our study has some limitations. For instance, while we focus on transfer of  intangibles from parent to 
subsidiaries, there may also be reverse transfer of  knowledge from capacity-enhancing affiliates back to MNE 
parents. But this still occurs in only a decidedly small minority of  all cases. However, this alternative model of  
the MNE is likely to grow more common in the future. Another incipient trend is that corporate knowledge is 
being increasingly codified. Tacit procedures that were embedded in the experience and routines of  engineers 
or managers are now written down in documents, software, or expert systems, altering at the margin the tacit 
vs. explicit mix of  proprietary corporate knowledge. Future studies could also use more refined measures of  
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intangible assets, should they become available in secondary databases. 
Nevertheless, our study makes several important contributions. With recently available detailed 
accounting data on the profitability of a large number of MNC affiliates, we confirmed the venerable 
assumption of international business studies that firm-specific intangible assets contribute positively to 
subsidiary profitability. Our study then tackled another interesting contemporary research issue – the extent to 
which different ‘distances’ between parent and subsidiary nations degrade or augment subsidiary profitability, 
ceteris paribus. In our study, we directly address and remedy the critique of  ‘distance’ studies, or as Shenkar (2012) 
put it, the “illusion of  symmetry” or the fallacy that they are bi-directionally neutral. We hope this study helps 
to refine and add to the measurement of ‘distance’ and by applying it to a affiliate performance, it has 
contributed greater insights on factors that affect foreign subsidiary performance. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs 
Firm characteristics    
 Parents    
  Profit 922.13 2110.65 21,093 
  Capital 3038.25 6581.22 21,108 
  Intangibles 1738.62 3853.00 21,108 
  Employment 45032.97 66908.59 21,108 
  Turnover 9722.66 18037.70 21,095 
 Affiliates    
  Return on assets 10.12 10.67 21,108 
  Capital 66.01 243.95 21,108 
  Intangibles 20.84 73.65 21,108 
  Employment 1348.70 3638.57 21,108 
  Turnover 353.95 743.23 21,108 
  Leverage 0.75 1.23 21,108 
  Firm age 29.09 26.63 21,108 
  Wage bill per worker 43564.15 23369.06 21,108 
  Majority owned 0.28 0.45 14,448 
      
  Survey Year 2002.46 2.57 21,108 
      
Country variables    
  GDP per capita, host country 26514.34 10418.19 21,108 
  GDP per capita, home country 33330.98 9024.60 21,108 
      
Dyadic Distance variables    
  IPR regimes 0.10 0.30 20,934 
  Technological capability (patents/population) 247.94 577.02 17,931 
  Economic Distance 6816.64 10937.00 21,108 
  Common language 0.20 0.40 21,091 
  Geographic 2828.38 3056.93 21,091 
Notes: All monetary firm-level variables (apart from wage bill per worker) are in millions of  Euros. Turnover, for 
parents (or affiliates) is their total sales. Capital, for parents (or affiliates) is measured as capital in total. Intangibles 
for parents (or affiliates) are accounting measures as per International Accounting Standards (IAS 38). is 
intangibles assets of  multinational parents (affiliates). Employment is the number of  employees in each case. 
Leverage, for affiliates is measured as the ratio of  debt to equity. Firm age, for affiliates is measured as the actual 
duration of  firms since the starting year of  their business. Wage bill per worker, for affiliates is measured as wage 
bill per worker. IPR Regime distance is the difference between the parent and the affiliate country of the IPR index 
in Park (2008). Technology capability distance between the parent and affiliate country is measured by the 
difference in the resident patent applications per one million population: 
)/()/( yHostCountr
residents
yHostCountryHomeCountr
residents
yHomeCountr PopulationPatentPopulationPatent   
GDP per capita is in US dollars. Economic development distance is measured as the difference between the parent 
and affiliate countries’ GDP per capita. Common language is a dummy equal to one if the parent and affiliate 
country have common official of primary language, otherwise it is zero. `Geographic distance' is great circle 
distance between capitals of the parent and affiliate country as per the CEPII dataset 
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Table 2: Correlation Table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Intangible, parent 1             
               
2 Intangibles, affiliate 0.058*** 1            
  (0.000)             
3 Leverage, affiliate 0.006 0.076*** 1           
  (0.422) (0.000)            
4 Firm age, affiliate 0.038*** 0.015** -0.004 1          
  (0.000) (0.028) (0.548)           
5 Wage, affiliate 0.087*** 0.018** 0.064*** 0.095*** 1         
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)          
6 Capital, affiliate 0.046*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.033*** 0.100*** 1        
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
7 GDP, host country -0.025*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.090*** 0.444*** -0.012* 1       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072)        
8 GDP, home country 0.084*** 0.009 0.030*** 0.009 0.193*** -0.050*** 0.374*** 1      
  (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.219) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
9 Technology dist. 0.006 -0.023*** -0.053*** -0.055*** 0.052*** -0.038*** -0.043*** 0.047*** 1     
  (0.455) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
10 IPR distance 0.071*** 0.014** -0.009 -0.079*** -0.227*** 0.010 -0.286*** -0.014* 0.186*** 1    
  (0.000) (0.040) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000)     
11 Economic dist. 0.093*** -0.061*** -0.039*** -0.078*** -0.264*** -0.029*** -0.644*** 0.469*** 0.079*** 0.264*** 1   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
12 Common language -0.017** 0.089*** 0.046*** 0.04*** 0.035*** 0.010 0.169*** 0.139*** -0.153*** -0.084*** -0.049*** 1  
  0.013 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
13 Geographic dist. 0.087 0.036*** -0.011 -0.061*** 0.033*** -0.054*** -0.045*** 0.156*** 0.431*** 0.382*** 0.171*** -0.167*** 1 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Notes: See notes to Table 1 and data section for details of each variable. Values in parentheses are p values. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01. 
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Table 3: Dependent variable: Return on Assets of  multinational affiliates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intangible Assets, parents  0.321*** 0.843** 0.906** 0.855** 
  (0.088) (0.416) (0.423) (0.422) 
Intangible Assets, affiliates 0.371*** 0.364*** 0.310*** 0.304*** 0.311*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) 
Leverage, affiliates -0.651*** -0.653*** -0.713*** -0.719*** -0.711*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
Firm age, affiliates 1.336*** 1.309*** 2.859** 3.103** 2.845** 
 (0.483) (0.480) (1.227) (1.230) (1.226) 
Wage bill per worker, affiliates 1.540*** 1.543*** 1.726*** 1.546*** 1.698*** 
 (0.393) (0.393) (0.559) (0.561) (0.559) 
Capital, affiliates -0.132 -0.150 -0.444 -0.418 -0.429 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.283) (0.285) (0.283) 
GDP per capita, host country 19.600*** 19.633*** 28.161*** 29.212*** 28.080*** 
 (2.118) (2.118) (2.443) (2.471) (2.456) 
GDP per capita, home country 1.115 0.758 -1.020 -1.106 -0.986 
 (0.901) (0.907) (1.651) (1.661) (1.649) 
      
First stages      
Intangibles per worker, parents (one lag)  0.514*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Intangibles per worker, parents (two lags)  -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.104*** 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
      
No. observation 21,108 21,108 6,770 6,764 6,764 
F statistics 65.994 62.701 40.227 39.985 39.808 
R-squared 0.132 0.133 0.121 0.121 0.12 
Under-identification test   839.539 821.905 816.222 
P-value   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test   503.851 491.234 487.203 
Over-identification test-Hansen   0.722 0.851 0.798 
P-value   0.395 0.356 0.372 
Notes: Dependent variable: return on assets. All columns include affiliate firm fixed effects and business cycle 
fixed effects. Column 4 has weights based on foreign direct investment outflows of  parent country, and column 5 
uses weights based on foreign direct investment inflows of  affiliate country. Values in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics - quality of  parent matches 
 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs 
Panel A: benchmark   
 Intangible asset difference -0.00759 1.371459 1,199 
 Employee difference -0.01841 1.009657 1,199 
 Capital (per worker) difference 0.008898 0.998258 1,199 
 Profit (per worker) difference -0.0031 1.069608 1,199 
 Sales difference -0.01142 1.018195 1,199 
 Age difference -0.00691 1.01976 1,197 
 Subsidiary difference -0.01792 0.656169 1,199 
 Same sector 1 0 1,199 
 Same Country 1 0 1,199 
 Same year 0.332777 0.471404 1,199 
 Probability difference -0.00061 0.028871 1,199 
     
Panel B: matching also on parent intangibles   
 Intangible asset difference -0.07122 1.331916 1,203 
 Employee difference -0.06587 1.013187 1,203 
 Capital (per worker) difference -0.03236 1.006765 1,203 
 Profit (per worker) difference 0.007666 1.067135 1,203 
 Sales difference -0.07444 1.050364 1,203 
 Age difference -0.00599 1.030458 1,202 
 Subsidiary difference -0.04491 0.703237 1,203 
 Same sector 1 0 1,203 
 Same Country 1 0 1,203 
 Same year 0.33749 0.47305 1,203 
 Probability difference -0.00046 0.029266 1,203 
Notes: The “difference” variables are measured in terms of  the difference between the value of  the variable for 
the original parent and the matched parent, over the mean of  the two values. Difference in sales, profit per worker, 
employees, capital per worker, intangibles, firm age and subsidiary are denominated in thousands. The `same' 
variables (sector, country, year) are dummies equal to one if  the variable takes the same value in the original and 
matched parents. Probability difference is the difference between the probabilities of  being a parent of  the original 
and matched counterpart. 
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Table 5: Falsification test: Internalisation of Resource based on matched parents pairs 
 
 Benchmark matching also on 
   parent intangibles 
intangibles, 'matched parent' -0.086 -0.095 -0.061 -0.056 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.116) 
Intangible Assets, affiliates 0.513*** 0.524*** 0.541*** 0.546*** 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.100) (0.100) 
Leverage, affiliates -0.837*** -0.854*** -0.652*** -0.649*** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) 
Firm age, affiliates 2.930*** 3.165*** 2.063*** 2.262*** 
 (0.672) (0.673) (0.762) (0.763) 
Wage bill per worker, affiliates 2.897*** 2.991*** 2.476*** 2.588*** 
 (0.486) (0.489) (0.501) (0.504) 
Capital, affiliates 0.248 0.269 0.234 0.227 
 (0.260) (0.261) (0.277) (0.279) 
GDP per capita, host country 16.612*** 16.900*** 24.653*** 24.794*** 
 (1.557) (1.567) (2.127) (2.136) 
GDP per capita, home country -12.124*** -12.773*** 3.445 3.117 
 (1.674) (1.692) (2.449) (2.487) 
     
No. parents 919 919 903 903 
No. affiliates 2,361 2,361 2,306 2,306 
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.142 0.151 0.152 
No. observation 7031 7031 6909 6909 
F statistics  94.334 96.737 45.225 45.593 
Notes: Dependent variable: Return on Assets of  multinational affiliate profits. Intangibles, ‘matched parents’ is 
intangibles of  matched parents. All columns include affiliate firm fixed effects and business cycle fixed effects. 
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01. 
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Table 6: Effects of the “Distance” Variables on the Intangible Asset-Affiliate Profitability link 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intangibles*IPR Dist. -0.028***     
 (0.010)     
IPR distance -0.041***     
 (0.015)     
Intangibles*Technology Dist.  0.047**    
  (0.020)    
Technology distance  -0.120**    
  (0.052)    
Intangibles*Economic Dist.   -0.026***   
   (0.006)   
Economic distance   -0.483***   
   (0.055)   
Intangibles*Com. Language    0.063**  
    (0.027)  
Common Language    0.097  
    (0.069)  
Intangibles*Geographic Dist.     -0.018* 
     (0.010) 
Geography distance     -0.043*** 
     (0.016) 
Intangible Assets, parents 0.078*** 0.125*** 0.082*** 0.019* 0.035*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) 
Intangible Assets, affiliates 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Leverage, affiliates -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Wage bill per worker, affiliates 0.095*** 0.171*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Capital, affiliates -0.015 0.031 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
GDP per capita, host country 1.017*** 0.485*** 0.605*** 1.083*** 1.080*** 
 (0.067) (0.038) (0.082) (0.058) (0.058) 
GDP per capita, home country 0.022 -0.076*** 0.129*** 0.004 0.008 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) 
      
No. observation 20,934 17,931 21,108 21,091 21,091 
F statistics  108.414 197.811 121.656 115.336 115.522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.136 0.138 0.104 0.104 
Notes: Dependent variable: multinational affiliate return on assets. All variables (apart from common 
language) are standardized by subtracting the mean of  each variable (across all non-missing observations) 
and then dividing by the standard deviation of  the variable across all non-missing observations. Values in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.  
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Table 7: Internalization effect – Further test 
 Embeddedness Experience 
 Major Minority Firm 
 Owned Owned Age 
Intangible, parents * Firm age   0.093*** 
   (0.016) 
Intangible Assets, parents 0.764*** 0.185** 0.227*** 
 (0.189) (0.092) (0.085) 
Intangible Assets, affiliates 0.349*** 0.564*** 0.416*** 
 (0.109) (0.072) (0.050) 
Leverage, affiliates -0.651*** -0.667*** -0.672*** 
 (0.147) (0.103) (0.070) 
Firm age, affiliates 1.131 0.960* 0.430 
 (0.783) (0.522) (0.456) 
Wage bill per worker, affiliates 1.602*** 1.096*** 2.183*** 
 (0.602) (0.363) (0.268) 
Capital, affiliates -0.448 -0.501*** -0.042 
 (0.318) (0.191) (0.141) 
GDP per capita, host country 13.975*** 19.065*** 8.527*** 
 (2.555) (1.442) (0.652) 
GDP per capita, home country 4.126** -1.561 -2.683*** 
 (1.883) (1.360) (0.749) 
    
No. observation 4,090 10,358 21,108 
F statistics  22.085 74.538 229.285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.161 0.12 
Notes: Dependent variable: multinational affiliate return on assets. All columns control for affiliate firm fixed 
effect and business cycle effect. Column 1 includes majority owned affiliates only. Column 2 includes minority 
owned affiliates only. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 
0.01.  
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Appendix A -- Table A: Number of firms and key variables per economy 
Economy N ROA Leverage Age Wage Intangibles N Intangibles 
 Parent Affiliate 
Australia 14 9.88 0.55 25.57 46.3 134 18 294.53 
Austria 62 9.52 1.26 35.72 54.62 21.46 29 93.01 
Belgium 278 8.88 0.94 33.65 59.49 14.21 126 418.29 
Brazil 0      1 1.68 
Bulgaria 35 11.4 0.61 25.31 5.76 4.42 0  
Canada 0      3 128.81 
China 9 8.99 0.18 11.25 7.01 21.14 1 25.09 
Czech Republic 171 11.91 0.49 12.37 13.71 1.6 1 233 
Denmark 129 10.26 0.82 26.72 47.97 26.54 65 281.54 
Estonia 55 14.99 0.78 11.17 9.62 0.8 1 0.13 
Finland 131 13.48 0.63 25.5 41.67 6.88 69 257.48 
France 1,096 9.43 0.5 30 52 12.18 250 1203.23 
Germany 442 11.99 1.65 41.7 59.99 24.26 199 1010.4 
Greece 2 11.02 0.55 39.67 37.51 26.08 15 291.61 
Hong Kong, China 6 5.14 0.94 72.36 14.47 15.61 3 108.01 
Hungary 27 20.56 0.57 14.88 19.25 7.77 4 49.15 
Iceland 0      5 70.77 
Indonesia 2 30.67 0.03 30.67 5.87 0.1 0  
Ireland 5 12.79 1.49 21.89 43 164.39 21 299.08 
Italy 598 9.37 0.77 26.2 43.95 11.11 127 636.63 
Japan 17 11.89 0.61 27.62 30.97 73.08 127 284.43 
Latvia 3 9.35 0.5 11.33 9.04 0.13 0  
Liechtenstein 0      1 33.76 
Lithuania 1 5.39 0.47 11 7.6 5.3 2 2.32 
Luxembourg 10 9.29 0.59 47.52 34.49 3.28 14 701.25 
Malaysia 11 16.45 0.37 31.74 11.99 56.52 8 28.74 
Mexico 0      1 2395.33 
The Netherlands 151 9.62 1.02 32.39 53.68 50.09 219 455.67 
Norway 107 12.52 0.76 12.67 57.13 11.64 30 291.68 
Philippines 3 6.2 0.29 48 9.13 9.1 0  
Poland 151 12.82 0.47 24.92 11.24 14 6 29.51 
Portugal 109 9.56 0.59 32.1 25.19 42.34 11 229.01 
Romania 109 17.46 0.56 7.82 7.39 1.65 3 1 
Russia 1 19.61 0.11 15 9.25 2.31 5 119.54 
Singapore 17 11.54 0.27 23.1 18.42 11.53 13 520.9 
Slovenia 1 10.98 0 131 19.42 0.06 1 0.01 
South Africa 5 12.57 0.58 46.9 13.34 169.49 5 83.03 
South Korea 31 11.5 0.35 15.31 17.85 5.28 2 1.19 
Spain 297 9.79 0.57 34.61 41.56 18.7 89 322.47 
Sweden 168 9.16 1.07 38.42 29.48 25.45 163 231.34 
Switzerland 21 7.33 1.08 64.7 44.1 55.47 70 839.2 
Thailand 23 9.72 0.41 31.07 6.11 21.17 1 7.92 
Turkey 3 13.43 0.15 29.33 18.41 8 3 163.73 
UK 709 9.25 0.76 27.77 38.43 50.15 168 899.19 
US 0      421 1494.43 
Notes: The above table contains 2,301 multinational parents and 5,010 overseas affiliates. Intangibles variables are 
in millions of  Euros, and wage bill per worker variable is in thousands of  Euros. 
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Figure 1: Impact of  MNC Intangible Assets on Subsidiary Profitability (ROA) 
Depending on Whether the Subsidiary is in a Superior or Inferior Country 
Location Compared to the Host FDI Investor Nation 
 
Notes: In order to compare the relative effects the distance variables, we standardize them 
by subtracting the mean of  each variable (across all non-missing observations) and then 
dividing by the standard deviation of  the variable across all non-missing observations. 
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